10
non-compensable safety controls
Standard Pilot v0.9 · Pillar 4
On the worst day, nobody should improvise.
On the worst day, the organisation already knows what to do — and the people who rely on it knew where to go before they needed it.
Complete working proposal — not an approved certification standard.
Clinical, safeguarding, legal, privacy, lived-experience, operational, measurement and governance reviewers must challenge it before adoption.
5
Pillar 4 indicators
20
cumulative stage requirements
10
risk-routed addenda
Purpose
Crisis Response and Safeguarding
Sport organisations can recognise, escalate and respond to urgent mental-health and safeguarding concerns through clear, lawful, rehearsed and people-readable systems.
Architecture decision recorded
P4.5 was approved for the working architecture on 15 July 2026. The draft framework now contains five Pillar 4 indicators and twenty-one indicators overall; the detailed requirements still require expert validation before certification use.
Minimum Safety Foundation
Safety is a floor, not a score.
Every applicable control must be present before a pathway badge or Diamond certification can be considered. Strong performance elsewhere cannot compensate for a missing safeguard.
MSF-01Accountable leads and conflict-safe backup
There are named, competent people responsible for crisis response and safeguarding — and a route that still works if one of them is absent or implicated.
Accountable leads and conflict-safe backup
There are named, competent people responsible for crisis response and safeguarding — and a route that still works if one of them is absent or implicated.
The organisation shall
The organisation shall appoint accountable safeguarding and crisis-response leads, define their authority and competence, provide conflict-safe backups, and maintain governing accountability.
May demonstrate practice
- Current appointment records and role descriptions
- Competence records
- Backup and absence arrangements
- Reporting line and conflict route
Not sufficient
- Unnamed responsibility
- One person with no backup
- A route controlled by the person complained about
Proposed consequence: Proposed major if absent or ineffective; potentially critical where conflict, retaliation, concealment or grave danger is involved.
MSF-02Clear crisis and safeguarding procedures
The organisation has connected but distinct routes for urgent mental-health concerns, immediate danger and safeguarding reports.
Clear crisis and safeguarding procedures
The organisation has connected but distinct routes for urgent mental-health concerns, immediate danger and safeguarding reports.
The organisation shall
The organisation shall maintain current, accessible and operational procedures covering urgent mental-health and self-harm or suicide concerns, immediate danger, safeguarding disclosures, emergency action, confidentiality limits, records, external escalation, handoff and post-incident support.
May demonstrate practice
- Controlled procedures and quick-reference role aids
- Approval and version history
- Local jurisdictional addenda
- Communication records
Not sufficient
- A generic physical emergency plan
- A hotline poster without roles
- One combined workflow that confuses clinical and safeguarding decisions
Proposed consequence: Proposed major if absent or materially incomplete; potentially critical for deliberate non-activation during grave danger or concealment.
MSF-03Current urgent-help and emergency information
People know where to go, in the right country and language, and the information is still correct.
Current urgent-help and emergency information
People know where to go, in the right country and language, and the information is still correct.
The organisation shall
The organisation shall provide and actively communicate current emergency, crisis, safeguarding and qualified-support information wherever people train, compete, travel, reside or use the organisation remotely, with a named owner and verification cycle.
May demonstrate practice
- Controlled contact register and verification log
- Website, app, venue and travel materials
- Onboarding records
- Accessible alternative formats
Not sufficient
- A stale poster or dead link
- Information hidden behind a login
- A website page with no evidence people were informed
Proposed consequence: Proposed major if no usable route exists or material coverage is stale; dangerously wrong information may be critical.
MSF-04Protected reporting and non-retaliation
People can report harm without being forced through the person involved, and speaking up cannot cost them selection, work or standing.
Protected reporting and non-retaliation
People can report harm without being forced through the person involved, and speaking up cannot cost them selection, work or standing.
The organisation shall
The organisation shall operate visible confidential reporting routes, including a conflict-safe alternative; explain anonymity and confidentiality limits honestly; restrict access; prohibit retaliation and performance disadvantage; and define urgent escalation.
May demonstrate practice
- Reporting channels and athlete-facing guidance
- Conflict-safe alternative route
- Anti-retaliation rule
- Access matrix and handling procedure
Not sufficient
- “Talk to your coach” as the only route
- A shared performance inbox
- Absolute secrecy promises
- A code of conduct with no reporting process
Proposed consequence: Proposed major if inaccessible or conflict-prone; retaliation, intimidation, suppression or witness interference is proposed as critical.
MSF-05Role boundaries and access to qualified help
Coaches and staff support and refer; they do not diagnose, treat beyond competence or use a score to decide that help is unnecessary.
Role boundaries and access to qualified help
Coaches and staff support and refer; they do not diagnose, treat beyond competence or use a score to decide that help is unnecessary.
The organisation shall
The organisation shall define role boundaries, prohibit unqualified clinical assessment or treatment, prohibit non-clinical risk scoring as a reason to withhold escalation, and maintain real routes to appropriately qualified professional and emergency help.
May demonstrate practice
- Role-boundary statements and referral criteria
- Provider qualification checks
- Staff learning and supervision
- Current escalation routes
Not sufficient
- An unverified provider name
- A coach-administered “low-risk” checklist
- Uncommunicated referral boundaries
Proposed consequence: Proposed major for systemic boundary failure; unsafe unqualified clinical practice or deliberate false reassurance may be critical.
MSF-06Immediate safety and emergency escalation
When serious danger may be present, the organisation protects immediate safety and calls the right emergency help rather than waiting for certainty.
Immediate safety and emergency escalation
When serious danger may be present, the organisation protects immediate safety and calls the right emergency help rather than waiting for certainty.
The organisation shall
The organisation shall prioritise emergency services, immediate physical safety, compassionate supervision appropriate to the situation, safe transfer, continuity and proportionate protection from relevant hazards when immediate danger or serious medical compromise is suspected.
May demonstrate practice
- Emergency algorithm and site/travel arrangements
- Relevant drills
- Incident and handoff records
- Routed hazard controls
Not sufficient
- Waiting for a non-clinical score
- Leaving a person alone during known immediate danger
- Punitive isolation or automatic long-term exclusion
Proposed consequence: Ignoring known immediate danger, intentionally delaying emergency help or knowingly maintaining unsafe access may be critical.
MSF-07Sensitive-information protection
Mental-health, help-seeking and safeguarding information is only seen and used by people who genuinely need it — and is not quietly turned into a selection tool.
Sensitive-information protection
Mental-health, help-seeking and safeguarding information is only seen and used by people who genuinely need it — and is not quietly turned into a selection tool.
The organisation shall
The organisation shall collect and share only necessary information; define lawful authority, consent and emergency exceptions; restrict access; separate protected information from performance, employment and selection decisions unless necessary, lawful and transparent; and define retention, deletion, rights and breach response.
May demonstrate practice
- Privacy notice and record of processing
- Access matrix and logs
- Retention schedule and secure case system
- Redaction, breach and athlete-rights procedures
Not sufficient
- A generic privacy notice
- Health details in informal messages
- Unrestricted performance-staff access
- Treating consent as the answer to every power imbalance
Proposed consequence: Proposed major for inadequate controls or unnecessary access; deliberate harmful disclosure, retaliation or systemic exposure may be critical.
MSF-08Serious-incident recording, escalation and case control
Serious events are recorded safely, the right people and authorities are told, conflicts are managed and there is an auditable decision trail.
Serious-incident recording, escalation and case control
Serious events are recorded safely, the right people and authorities are told, conflicts are managed and there is an auditable decision trail.
The organisation shall
The organisation shall define serious incidents; record material facts, decisions and actions with restricted access; preserve evidence lawfully; manage conflicts; notify appropriate internal and external authorities within applicable timeframes; and maintain an auditable trail through closure.
May demonstrate practice
- Serious-incident definition and restricted case register
- Escalation matrix and notification log
- Conflict declarations
- Access logs and closure rationale
Not sufficient
- Incidents scattered across personal inboxes
- The accused person controlling the case
- No record of safety decisions
- Claiming no process is needed because no incident was recorded
Proposed consequence: Proposed major for material record or escalation failure; concealment, destruction, retaliation or failure of an urgent legal duty may be critical.
MSF-09Role-appropriate training and rehearsal
The people around athletes know what to notice, what to do, what not to do and who to contact — and they have demonstrated it, not just attended a course.
Role-appropriate training and rehearsal
The people around athletes know what to notice, what to do, what not to do and who to contact — and they have demonstrated it, not just attended a course.
The organisation shall
The organisation shall provide induction and current role-specific learning for relevant staff, volunteers and contractors on recognition, boundaries, reporting, emergency action, confidentiality and non-retaliation; require safety-critical roles to rehearse relevant scenarios; and correct competence gaps.
May demonstrate practice
- Role and competence matrix
- Training content and completion records
- Observed scenarios or knowledge checks
- Remediation and duty restrictions
Not sufficient
- One generic course for every role
- Attendance without competence checks
- Excluding volunteers
- No action after a failed scenario
Proposed consequence: Proposed major for systemic lack of coverage or capability; known incompetence left in a safety-critical role may become critical.
MSF-10Post-incident support and system learning
The response does not end when the emergency or report is transferred. People are supported, the organisation learns without blaming them, and action is checked.
Post-incident support and system learning
The response does not end when the emergency or report is transferred. People are supported, the organisation learns without blaming them, and action is checked.
The organisation shall
The organisation shall offer proportionate immediate and follow-up support to affected people, reporters, witnesses and responders; protect choice and privacy; separate welfare support from investigation; review serious incidents and near misses for contributing factors and system causes; assign corrective action; and verify effectiveness.
May demonstrate practice
- Support procedure and offer records
- Separation of welfare and investigation roles
- Redacted system review and CAPA
- Implementation evidence and re-test
Not sufficient
- Compulsory group debriefs
- Coach-led questioning framed as support
- Blaming the affected person
- A new policy with no implementation
Proposed consequence: Proposed major for absent support or review after a serious event; blame, coercion, retaliation, concealment or renewed danger may be critical.
Scheme integrity
Not scored as maturity. Still mandatory for trust.
SI-01
Cooperation and protected participation
The organisation shall provide truthful information and reasonable access for assessment, audit, complaints and protected corroboration; shall not coach, intimidate, identify or penalise participants; and shall declare relevant conflicts of interest.
Proposed consequence: Obstruction, witness influence, retaliation or evidence manipulation is proposed as critical.
SI-02
Truthful disclosure and material-change notification
The organisation shall disclose required incidents, investigations, sanctions and material risks fairly and shall notify MindsMelt of defined material changes during the life of any public recognition.
Proposed consequence: Knowing concealment or falsehood is proposed as critical; a late but good-faith notification may be major.
SI-03
Accurate pathway and certification claims
The organisation shall describe only the status, stage, assessed scope, dates and meaning it has actually earned. Bronze, Silver and Gold must never be described as certification.
Proposed consequence: Persistent or deliberate misrepresentation may lead to removal, suspension or revocation.
P4.1
Crisis and immediate-safety response
When an urgent mental-health, self-harm or suicide concern arises, the organisation acts promptly, compassionately and within role to protect immediate safety and activate qualified or emergency help.
Construct
The organisation’s rehearsed capability to respond safely to acute mental-health concerns and immediate danger.
Core obligation
Maintain and operate a country- and context-appropriate crisis-response system defining recognition triggers, immediate safety actions, emergency activation, roles and backups, qualified handoff, confidentiality limits, records, after-hours and travel arrangements and follow-up — without requiring non-clinical diagnosis or risk scoring.
Boundary
P4.1 owns acute response, preparedness and immediate safety. Routine access belongs mainly in Pillar 1; training-system governance in Pillar 2; post-incident learning in P4.5.
MSF-02MSF-03MSF-05MSF-06
BronzeP4.1-BR
Current crisis and immediate-safety response protocol
Operating safety baseline
P4.1-BR
Current crisis and immediate-safety response protocol
Operating safety baseline
The organisation shall
The organisation shall maintain and communicate a current, accessible and country-appropriate protocol for urgent mental-health concerns, possible self-harm or suicide, recent attempts and immediate danger. The protocol shall define recognition triggers, immediate safety actions, emergency-service activation, responsible roles and backups, qualified handoff, confidentiality limits, minimum records, after-hours and travel arrangements, and post-incident follow-up. Non-clinical personnel shall not diagnose or use a risk score to decide that escalation is unnecessary.
Minimum acceptable evidence
- Approved protocol and one-page role aid
- Jurisdiction-specific emergency and crisis contacts
- Named owner and backup
- Athlete-readable version and communication evidence
- Version and scope history
Evidence that is not sufficient
- Generic physical emergency plan
- Hotline poster without roles
- Copied template with wrong local services
- Coach-used “low-risk” checklist
- Policy that assumes self-referral
How MindsMelt would test it
Document review · Owner walkthrough · Frontline scenario interview · Contact verification
Evidence validity
Protocol reviewed within 12 months and after a serious incident or material change; contacts verified within three months and before new travel or event contexts.
Proposed failure level
Major if absent or materially incomplete. Potentially critical if known immediate danger is ignored, emergency action intentionally delayed or non-clinical scoring withholds escalation.
Expert review required
Clinical, suicide-prevention, safeguarding, jurisdictional legal, lived-experience and operational review. · S01–S08, S14; I01–I03
SilverP4.1-SI
Operational activation and rehearsal of the crisis protocol
Operational and recorded
P4.1-SI
Operational activation and rehearsal of the crisis protocol
Operational and recorded
The organisation shall
The organisation shall operationalise the crisis protocol through current role assignments, accessible role aids, verified contact routes, defined availability and handoff arrangements, recorded induction and at least one relevant rehearsal or structured scenario exercise during the operating year. Activations, exercises and identified failures shall be recorded and assigned corrective action.
Minimum acceptable evidence
- Role and availability rota
- Completed exercise record
- Training and induction records
- Redacted activation or near-miss records
- Corrective action and re-test
Evidence that is not sufficient
- Attendance-only training
- Exercise with no findings
- Untested contact list
- Reliance on one unavailable person
- Claims that staff simply know what to do
How MindsMelt would test it
Observe or review a scenario · Sample role coverage · Check contact activation · Review remediation · Interview frontline roles
Evidence validity
Current operating cycle; exercise normally within the previous 12 months and after a material protocol failure or change.
Proposed failure level
Major for systemic lack of readiness or no viable backup; minor for an isolated documentation gap where competence and the route remain demonstrable.
Expert review required
Clinical, safeguarding and operational exercise-design review. · S04, S06, S08, S09, S14
GoldP4.1-GO
Risk-based crisis planning and context-specific prevention
Systematic and improving
P4.1-GO
Risk-based crisis planning and context-specific prevention
Systematic and improving
The organisation shall
The organisation shall maintain a risk-based crisis programme covering foreseeable scenarios across sites, travel, competition, residence, remote contact and relevant hazards; verify responder coverage and emergency handoff across those contexts; and maintain controlled addenda for high-risk environments. Where people may access firearms, medicines, vehicles, heights, water or other potentially lethal means, a lawful, proportionate and clinically reviewed safety addendum shall define immediate controls without automatic punishment or unnecessary disclosure.
Minimum acceptable evidence
- Scenario and context risk register
- Multi-site and travel addenda
- Means-safety addendum where routed
- Trend and governance review
- Retested corrective action
Evidence that is not sufficient
- Generic risk register
- Automatic punitive exclusion
- Unsafe public operational detail
- Statistics with no action
- Review limited to procedural compliance
How MindsMelt would test it
Risk-register review · Exercises across contexts · Redacted trend review · Leadership minutes · CAPA effectiveness check
Evidence validity
Reviewed at least annually and after serious incident, major event, new jurisdiction or material change.
Proposed failure level
Major for a missing high-risk addendum or repeated uncorrected failures; potentially critical where known hazard access is deliberately unmanaged during immediate danger.
Expert review required
Clinical, means-safety or domain, legal, safeguarding and lived-experience review. · S01–S08, S14
DiamondP4.1-DI
Independently verified crisis-response reliability
Embedded and independently verified
P4.1-DI
Independently verified crisis-response reliability
Embedded and independently verified
The organisation shall
The organisation shall demonstrate through independent review that its crisis-response system is consistently implemented across the assessed scope. Review shall include protected interviews, observation or reconstruction of at least one relevant exercise, sampling of redacted activations or near misses where available, verification of external routes, and evidence that leadership has addressed systemic weaknesses. No open critical or major crisis-response finding may remain.
Minimum acceptable evidence
- Independent audit and sampling rationale
- Observed or independently reviewed exercise
- Protected athlete and frontline corroboration
- Redacted case or near-miss sample
- Verified improvements
Evidence that is not sufficient
- Selected testimonials only
- Policy-only audit
- Management present during interviews
- Unnecessary raw clinical notes
- No sampling outside the flagship team
How MindsMelt would test it
Independent case sampling · Protected interviews · Observed scenario · External route verification · Cross-site consistency review
Evidence validity
Normally the previous 12–24 months, adjusted for operating history and incident volume.
Proposed failure level
Major for inconsistent implementation, unreliable handoff or untrusted access; critical for concealment, retaliation, falsification or grave unaddressed danger.
Expert review required
Independent clinical and safeguarding auditor competence plus protected-interview protocol. · S04–S09, S13, S14
P4.2
Safeguarding governance, protected reporting and case control
People can raise safeguarding, abuse, coercion or conduct concerns through a route that does not expose them to avoidable harm, retaliation or control by the person involved.
Construct
A conflict-safe safeguarding system combining accountable roles, protected reporting, controlled triage, case governance, oversight and non-retaliation.
Core obligation
Operate a safeguarding system with competent accountable roles and backups, visible reporting and conflict routes, honest confidentiality limits, restricted records, fair triage and case control, external escalation where required, oversight and explicit protection from retaliation and performance disadvantage.
Boundary
P4.2 owns operational reporting and case governance. Organisation-wide leadership accountability belongs mainly in Pillar 3; cultural prevention of abusive or coercive behaviour belongs mainly in Pillar 5.
MSF-01MSF-04MSF-07MSF-08
BronzeP4.2-BR
Safeguarding accountability and protected reporting
Operating safety baseline
P4.2-BR
Safeguarding accountability and protected reporting
Operating safety baseline
The organisation shall
The organisation shall appoint a competent safeguarding-accountable officer and backup; provide visible reporting routes, including an alternative route where the primary officer or leadership may be implicated; explain confidentiality and anonymity limits; prohibit retaliation and performance disadvantage; define immediate-danger escalation; and restrict case information to authorised people.
Minimum acceptable evidence
- Role appointment and backup
- Athlete-facing reporting information
- Alternative conflict route
- Non-retaliation rule
- Restricted access and escalation procedure
Evidence that is not sufficient
- Only a coach or manager can receive reports
- Performance-accessible inbox
- Absolute anonymity promises
- No leadership conflict route
- Code without a reporting process
How MindsMelt would test it
Athlete-perspective walkthrough · Role and conflict interview · Access-control review · Communication sample
Evidence validity
Appointments and routes current; communication evidence from the current season or programme.
Proposed failure level
Major if no usable or conflict-safe route exists; critical for retaliation, intimidation, suppression or exposure to grave harm.
Expert review required
Safeguarding, legal, privacy and lived-experience review. · S05, S09–S12, S14
SilverP4.2-SI
Operational safeguarding triage and case management
Operational and recorded
P4.2-SI
Operational safeguarding triage and case management
Operational and recorded
The organisation shall
The organisation shall operate a documented safeguarding triage and case-management process that records receipt, immediate safety decisions, conflict checks, acknowledgement, external referrals or notifications, investigation and disciplinary boundaries, updates, support, closure and retention. Case access and changes shall be auditable, and people handling cases shall have role-specific competence and supervision or specialist access.
Minimum acceptable evidence
- Case workflow and triage criteria
- Restricted case system
- Acknowledgement and status templates
- Conflict declarations
- Redacted case or scenario sample
- Specialist access
Evidence that is not sufficient
- Personal email or message records
- No distinction from disciplinary investigation
- Accused person managing the complaint
- No safety-decision record
- No closure rationale
How MindsMelt would test it
Redacted case or scenario sampling · Access-log review · Safeguarding-role interviews · External escalation and support review · Timeliness review
Evidence validity
Current procedure; previous 12 months or every case if fewer; access controls current.
Proposed failure level
Major for systemic case-control, conflict or timeliness failure; critical for concealment, destruction, retaliation or knowingly unsafe allocation.
Expert review required
Safeguarding case management, legal fairness, privacy and audit review. · S05, S09–S12, S14
GoldP4.2-GO
Safeguarding oversight, retaliation monitoring and route performance
Systematic and improving
P4.2-GO
Safeguarding oversight, retaliation monitoring and route performance
Systematic and improving
The organisation shall
The organisation shall monitor safeguarding-system performance using protected aggregate information, including route use, response times, unresolved cases, conflicts, repeat concerns, retaliation indicators and accessibility barriers. Leadership shall receive proportionate reports, ensure corrective action and provide an independent escalation route for concerns involving senior leadership or the safeguarding function itself.
Minimum acceptable evidence
- Aggregate dashboard and definitions
- Governing or independent oversight
- Retaliation monitoring
- Independent escalation route
- Corrective-action feedback loop
Evidence that is not sufficient
- Low complaint numbers treated as proof
- Identifiable case publication
- No analysis of non-use
- Unnecessary raw files to leadership
- No action on repeat concerns
How MindsMelt would test it
Aggregate trend review · Leadership minutes · Protected feedback · Conflict scenario test · CAPA effectiveness review
Evidence validity
At least annual system review, more frequently for active serious cases or high-risk programmes.
Proposed failure level
Major for absent oversight or repeated unaddressed patterns; critical for leadership interference, retaliation or concealment.
Expert review required
Safeguarding, governance, lived-experience, privacy and measurement review. · S05, S09, S10, S14
DiamondP4.2-DI
Conflict-safe and independently corroborated safeguarding system
Embedded and independently verified
P4.2-DI
Conflict-safe and independently corroborated safeguarding system
Embedded and independently verified
The organisation shall
The organisation shall demonstrate through independent audit and protected participant evidence that safeguarding concerns can be raised and handled without inappropriate influence from coaching, selection, employment, commercial or senior leadership interests. Auditors shall sample case governance, access, conflict decisions, support and corrective action; test the alternative reporting route; and confirm that no unresolved major or critical safeguarding-system failure remains.
Minimum acceptable evidence
- Independent or externally overseen route
- Protected participant interviews
- Redacted case-governance sample
- Conflict and recusal records
- Independent closure of major findings
Evidence that is not sufficient
- Conflicted internal hotline
- Management-selected or observed interviews
- No test of alternative route
- Only successful cases sampled
- Unresolved retaliation concerns
How MindsMelt would test it
Independent case and access sampling · Protected interviews · Alternative-route test · Conflict and external-escalation review · Retaliation assessment
Evidence validity
Normally the previous 12–24 months, adjusted for case volume and organisational history.
Proposed failure level
Major for unreliable independence, access or protection; critical for retaliation, witness manipulation, concealment or grave ongoing harm.
Expert review required
Independent safeguarding auditor, privacy and procedural-fairness review. · S05, S09–S12, S14
P4.3
External escalation, referral and continuity
When the organisation cannot or should not manage the concern internally, people are connected safely to real, qualified, emergency or statutory help without being abandoned between services.
Construct
The reliability, qualification, accessibility and continuity of external and commissioned escalation routes.
Core obligation
Map, verify and operate external emergency, clinical, safeguarding, social-care and statutory routes; define activation, consent and minimum-information boundaries; support the person until handoff is complete; maintain backups for delay or failure; and monitor access and continuity across contexts.
Boundary
P4.3 owns urgent, statutory, after-hours, travel and failed-handoff pathways. Routine support access and ordinary waiting-time management belong mainly in Pillar 1.
MSF-03MSF-05MSF-06MSF-07
BronzeP4.3-BR
Mapped external services and qualified escalation routes
Operating safety baseline
P4.3-BR
Mapped external services and qualified escalation routes
Operating safety baseline
The organisation shall
The organisation shall maintain a current map of appropriate emergency, mental-health, safeguarding, social-care and other specialist services for the assessed scope; define when and how each route is activated; verify professional qualifications where services are represented as clinical; identify after-hours alternatives; and avoid claiming a formal partnership where only public contact details exist.
Minimum acceptable evidence
- Service and contact map
- Activation criteria and handoff role
- Qualification checks
- After-hours and backup routes
- Contact verification
- Accurate partnership claims
Evidence that is not sufficient
- Saved search results
- One provider for every jurisdiction
- No after-hours option
- Wellbeing app called emergency care
- Partnership claim without agreement
How MindsMelt would test it
Contact verification · Qualification sample · Jurisdiction walkthrough · After-hours review · Public-claim check
Evidence validity
Contacts verified within three months and before new travel or events; provider status checked at engagement or renewal.
Proposed failure level
Major if no viable qualified or emergency route exists for material scope; minor for isolated stale information with safe backup.
Expert review required
Clinical, safeguarding, jurisdictional legal and accessibility review. · S04–S09, S13, S14
SilverP4.3-SI
Tested handoff and continuity arrangements
Operational and recorded
P4.3-SI
Tested handoff and continuity arrangements
Operational and recorded
The organisation shall
The organisation shall test or evidence its external handoff arrangements; define who contacts the service, what minimum information may be shared, how consent and emergency exceptions are handled, how the person is supported until responsibility is transferred, and how reasonable follow-up and continuity are maintained without demanding unnecessary clinical information.
Minimum acceptable evidence
- Handoff procedure and role allocation
- Test call or redacted referral sample
- Minimum-information guidance
- After-hours transfer plan
- Continuity record
- Failed-handoff route
Evidence that is not sufficient
- Giving a phone number then closing the case
- Sending full files
- No acceptance confirmation
- No travel backup
- Coach requesting diagnosis details
How MindsMelt would test it
Redacted handoff review · Unavailable-provider scenario · Privacy check · Referral-role interview · Continuity sample
Evidence validity
Current operating cycle; at least one test or activation within 12 months and after material change.
Proposed failure level
Major for systemic failed handoff, abandonment or excessive disclosure; potentially critical where deliberate delay or disclosure creates grave harm.
Expert review required
Clinical handoff, privacy, safeguarding and operational review. · S04, S06, S08, S11–S14
GoldP4.3-GO
Capacity, backup and cross-context continuity
Systematic and improving
P4.3-GO
Capacity, backup and cross-context continuity
Systematic and improving
The organisation shall
The organisation shall monitor whether external and commissioned services are reachable, appropriately qualified, culturally and linguistically accessible, and capable of meeting expected demand. It shall maintain backup routes for service failure or delay, review waiting and escalation boundaries, define continuity across travel or transitions, and take corrective action where access barriers are identified.
Minimum acceptable evidence
- Capacity and waiting review
- Provider and backup matrix
- Language and accessibility plan
- Service confirmations
- Barrier and failure trends
- Corrective commissioning
Evidence that is not sufficient
- Contract treated as proof of access
- No rejected-referral monitoring
- Single-language provision
- No continuity after travel or deselection
- Invoice-only provider review
How MindsMelt would test it
Provider review · Aggregate access data · Athlete feedback · Travel scenario · CAPA verification
Evidence validity
At least annual review and after repeated failure, major scope change or a new jurisdiction.
Proposed failure level
Major for persistent access failure, unqualified service or no backup; critical for knowingly referring to unsafe or unlawful care.
Expert review required
Clinical governance, procurement, accessibility, privacy and lived-experience review. · S04, S06–S09, S13, S14
DiamondP4.3-DI
Independently verified external-care and escalation system
Embedded and independently verified
P4.3-DI
Independently verified external-care and escalation system
Embedded and independently verified
The organisation shall
The organisation shall demonstrate through independent verification that external and internal escalation arrangements are qualified, reachable, correctly represented and effective across the assessed scope. The audit shall sample qualifications, agreements or confirmed public routes, handoffs, failed referrals, continuity and privacy boundaries. Where the organisation commissions or controls clinical services, a qualified clinical-governance function shall oversee scope, independence, supervision, adverse events and escalation.
Minimum acceptable evidence
- Independent provider verification
- Redacted handoff and failure sample
- Clinical governance terms where routed
- Protected athlete feedback
- Service improvements
- Separation from selection
Evidence that is not sufficient
- Provider marketing alone
- Unverified licensure
- No clinical governance
- Utilisation-only data
- Care dependent on selection
How MindsMelt would test it
Independent qualification checks · Handoff and failure sampling · Clinical-governance interview · Protected corroboration · Cross-scope review
Evidence validity
Previous 12–24 months adjusted for service history and volume; qualifications current at decision.
Proposed failure level
Major for unreliable access, governance or confidentiality; critical for unsafe or unlicensed practice, concealment or deliberate interference with care.
Expert review required
Qualified clinical, safeguarding, privacy and audit reviewers. · S04, S06–S09, S11–S14
P4.4
Communication, role readiness and rehearsal
Athletes and staff know how to get urgent help or report harm, while the people expected to respond can demonstrate their role under realistic conditions.
Construct
The visibility, accessibility and demonstrated readiness of crisis and safeguarding routes across the workforce and participant population.
Core obligation
Communicate urgent-help, reporting and conflict routes at induction and through accessible ongoing channels; define concise role instructions; maintain role-based competence expectations; rehearse relevant scenarios; measure readiness; correct gaps; and independently verify awareness and activation at Diamond.
Boundary
P4.4 tests readiness to activate Pillar 4 systems. The broader organisational learning and training programme belongs mainly in Pillar 2.
MSF-03MSF-09CR-01
BronzeP4.4-BR
Visible urgent-help information and role instructions
Operating safety baseline
P4.4-BR
Visible urgent-help information and role instructions
Operating safety baseline
The organisation shall
The organisation shall communicate, at induction and through readily accessible ongoing channels, how to obtain urgent mental-health help, contact emergency services, report a safeguarding concern and use an alternative conflict route. Relevant personnel shall receive concise role instructions stating what to do, what not to do, who to contact and how to protect confidentiality.
Minimum acceptable evidence
- Induction material
- Website, app and venue signposting
- Role cards
- Translated and accessible versions
- Distribution records
- Digital quick-exit considerations
Evidence that is not sufficient
- Policy archive only
- One old email
- Technical legal language
- No disability, language or private-access alternative
- Manager-only information
How MindsMelt would test it
Athlete walkthrough · Induction and channel sampling · Accessibility review · Frontline interview · Contact accuracy check
Evidence validity
Current season or programme; reissued after material change and continuously available.
Proposed failure level
Major if people cannot reasonably find or use the route; minor for an isolated format gap where safe alternatives exist.
Expert review required
Lived-experience, accessibility, safeguarding, clinical and communications review. · S04–S10, S14
SilverP4.4-SI
Role-specific competence and scenario rehearsal
Operational and recorded
P4.4-SI
Role-specific competence and scenario rehearsal
Operational and recorded
The organisation shall
The organisation shall maintain a role-based competence matrix and provide training and rehearsal proportionate to each role’s likelihood of receiving a disclosure, observing distress, controlling access to hazards or activating an emergency route. Competence shall be checked through knowledge, discussion or observed scenarios, and gaps shall result in supervision, restricted duty or remedial learning.
Minimum acceptable evidence
- Role and competence matrix
- Training content and provider competence
- Completion and induction records
- Scenario results
- Remediation and restrictions
- Volunteer coverage
Evidence that is not sufficient
- One generic course
- Certificates without validity
- No competence check
- Volunteers excluded
- No response to a failed scenario
How MindsMelt would test it
Training sample · Observed scenario · Role interviews · Coverage analysis · Remediation review
Evidence validity
Induction before unsupervised duty; safety-critical scenario within the previous operating year.
Proposed failure level
Major for systemic lack of competence or coverage; minor for isolated overdue refresh with demonstrated competence and safe supervision.
Expert review required
Clinical and safeguarding content, adult-learning and operational review. · S04–S09, S14
GoldP4.4-GO
Readiness measurement and corrective improvement
Systematic and improving
P4.4-GO
Readiness measurement and corrective improvement
Systematic and improving
The organisation shall
The organisation shall measure crisis and safeguarding readiness using risk-based drills, knowledge or behavioural checks, coverage data and protected athlete feedback. It shall analyse differences across sites, roles, employment status, language and programme; correct identified gaps; and repeat testing to verify improvement.
Minimum acceptable evidence
- Readiness definitions
- Drill programme across contexts
- Coverage and competence analysis
- Protected athlete awareness results
- Remedial action and re-test
- Governance review
Evidence that is not sufficient
- Completion percentages only
- One headquarters exercise
- No nights, travel or temporary-role testing
- Receipt-only athlete survey
- No re-test
How MindsMelt would test it
Readiness-data sample · Observed exercise · Cross-site comparison · Protected feedback · Remediation verification
Evidence validity
At least annual review and after serious incident, high turnover or major scope change.
Proposed failure level
Major for material uncorrected readiness gaps or misleading claims; potentially critical if known incompetence remains in a safety-critical role and creates grave danger.
Expert review required
Measurement, clinical, safeguarding, lived-experience and audit review. · S04–S09, S14
DiamondP4.4-DI
Independently observed and athlete-corroborated readiness
Embedded and independently verified
P4.4-DI
Independently observed and athlete-corroborated readiness
Embedded and independently verified
The organisation shall
The organisation shall demonstrate through an independently observed or controlled scenario exercise and protected athlete and frontline corroboration that the crisis and safeguarding routes are understood and can be activated consistently across the assessed scope. The sample shall include relevant non-permanent roles and at least one context with reduced supervision, travel, event or after-hours risk where applicable.
Minimum acceptable evidence
- Independent exercise and observation
- Auditor-selected sample
- Protected interviews
- Cross-role and site findings
- Corrective actions and re-test
- Accessible alternatives
Evidence that is not sufficient
- Senior-staff-only staged demo
- Answer script shared in advance
- Management in interviews
- No contractor or volunteer sample
- No relevant after-hours or travel test
How MindsMelt would test it
Independent exercise · Protected interviews · Unaided route-finding test · Cross-scope sampling · CAPA verification
Evidence validity
Within the certification audit cycle with sustained-operation evidence across the previous 12–24 months.
Proposed failure level
Major for inconsistent activation or untrusted routes; critical for interview interference, retaliation or evidence manipulation.
Expert review required
Independent exercise assessor, safeguarding, clinical and interview-protection review. · S04–S10, S14
P4.5
Post-incident support, system learning and prevention
After a serious incident or near miss, affected people are treated with dignity and choice, while the organisation identifies system causes, acts and checks that similar harm is less likely to happen again.
Construct
The organisation’s capability to provide protected follow-up, conduct fair system review and convert learning into effective prevention.
Core obligation
Provide proportionate post-incident welfare support; separate support from investigation; review serious incidents and material near misses safely; identify contributing factors and system causes; assign and verify corrective action; analyse recurring risks and inequities; and independently demonstrate sustained improvement at Diamond.
Boundary
P4.5 owns welfare follow-up, learning, corrective action and prevention. Immediate response remains in P4.1; case control in P4.2; external continuity in P4.3.
MSF-10All Pillar 4 controls
BronzeP4.5-BR
Immediate and post-incident welfare support
Operating safety baseline when triggered
P4.5-BR
Immediate and post-incident welfare support
Operating safety baseline when triggered
The organisation shall
The organisation shall define how it offers immediate and follow-up support to the affected person, reporters, witnesses and responding personnel after a crisis or safeguarding incident. Support shall respect choice, privacy, cultural and accessibility needs; avoid forced disclosure; distinguish welfare support from investigation; and identify an owner for system review and corrective action.
Minimum acceptable evidence
- Post-incident support procedure
- Welfare and investigation role separation
- Minimum-data offer and follow-up record
- External support options
- Named review owner
- Return or re-entry considerations
Evidence that is not sufficient
- Compulsory group debrief
- Coach-led questioning framed as support
- Support conditional on withdrawing a complaint
- No follow-up
- Treating the person as reputational harm
How MindsMelt would test it
Procedure review · Redacted case or scenario · Support-role interviews · Consent and privacy check · Review-ownership check
Evidence validity
Current procedure; every serious incident in the assessment period or a tested scenario if none occurred.
Proposed failure level
Major if no support or review route follows a serious incident; critical for coercion, blame, retaliation or renewed immediate danger.
Expert review required
Trauma-informed clinical and safeguarding, lived-experience, privacy and employment or legal review. · S06, S08–S10, S14
SilverP4.5-SI
Structured review, system causes and corrective action
Operational and recorded
P4.5-SI
Structured review, system causes and corrective action
Operational and recorded
The organisation shall
The organisation shall conduct a timely, proportionate and psychologically safe post-incident review that distinguishes individual clinical information from system learning; identifies immediate containment, contributing system factors and system causes; assigns corrective actions, owners and deadlines; and records follow-up support and safe return or re-entry arrangements where relevant.
Minimum acceptable evidence
- Review trigger and template
- Redacted completed review or exercise
- System-factor analysis
- CAPA with owners and deadlines
- Return or re-entry plan
- Safely offered affected-person input
Evidence that is not sufficient
- Naming the distressed athlete as the cause
- Debrief with no action
- Review led solely by an implicated person
- Raw clinical detail to governance
- Closing action when only a policy was written
How MindsMelt would test it
Redacted review sample · CAPA trace · Review-owner interview · Affected-person protection check · Implementation verification
Evidence validity
Initiated promptly after safety stabilises; evidence covers the previous 12 months or every serious incident.
Proposed failure level
Major for no adequate review or ineffective CAPA; critical for blame, retaliation, concealment or evidence destruction.
Expert review required
Safeguarding and clinical, human factors, privacy, lived-experience and audit review. · S08, S09, S14
GoldP4.5-GO
Trend learning and prevention programme
Systematic and improving
P4.5-GO
Trend learning and prevention programme
Systematic and improving
The organisation shall
The organisation shall analyse serious incidents, near misses, failed referrals, exercise findings and retaliation or access concerns at system level; identify recurring risks and inequities; report proportionate findings to leadership; implement preventive actions; and verify effectiveness through re-test, monitoring or protected feedback.
Minimum acceptable evidence
- Aggregate trend framework
- Data-minimised dashboard
- Leadership risk review
- Preventive action programme
- Effectiveness measures and re-test
- Protected system-learning communication
Evidence that is not sufficient
- Identifiable case publication
- Counting without analysis
- No near-miss route
- Deadline-only closure
- Raw health data to leadership
How MindsMelt would test it
Trend and governance review · Prevention-action sample · Data-minimisation check · Protected feedback · Effectiveness verification
Evidence validity
At least annual formal review and more frequently after serious or repeated patterns.
Proposed failure level
Major for repeated unaddressed patterns, ineffective CAPA or harmful disclosure; critical for concealment or knowingly allowing grave risk to persist.
Expert review required
Clinical and safeguarding, human factors, privacy, measurement and governance review. · S01, S05, S08–S10, S14
DiamondP4.5-DI
Independent learning assurance and sustained improvement
Embedded and independently verified
P4.5-DI
Independent learning assurance and sustained improvement
Embedded and independently verified
The organisation shall
The organisation shall demonstrate through independent review that serious incidents and material near misses lead to fair, protected and effective system learning. The reviewer shall sample review quality, affected-person protections, corrective-action closure and sustained effectiveness; examine whether similar risks recur; and confirm that public or internal learning is communicated without exposing protected individuals. Where severity, conflict or systemic failure warrants it, an independent incident review shall be commissioned.
Minimum acceptable evidence
- Independent review and CAPA sample
- Sustained-effectiveness evidence
- Protected affected-person or representative input
- Independent-review triggers and terms
- Leadership response
- Safe aggregate communication
Evidence that is not sufficient
- Self-certifying effectiveness
- No recurrence sampling
- Pressured endorsement
- Identifying public transparency
- Review controlled by implicated leadership
How MindsMelt would test it
Independent review and CAPA sampling · Recurrence analysis · Protected interviews · Governance and communications review · Surveillance check
Evidence validity
Previous 12–24 months and historical serious patterns relevant to current scope; effectiveness evidence current.
Proposed failure level
Major for weak independence, ineffective learning or recurrence; critical for concealment, retaliation, manipulation or grave unresolved systemic risk.
Expert review required
Independent safeguarding and clinical, human factors, privacy, governance and lived-experience review. · S05, S08–S10, S14
Controlled routing
The safety function stays. The evidence scales.
Additional obligations activate when the assessed scope includes a material risk context. “Not applicable” requires a defined reason that can be verified.
RA-01
Minors and adults at risk
Consent, assent, capacity, age-appropriate communication, reporting duties, safe recruitment and protected participation.
RA-02
Residential, boarding and overnight programmes
Twenty-four-hour responsibility, night response, private reporting, room and visitor boundaries, medicine and dangerous-item controls and continuity with home services.
RA-03
Travel, camps and cross-border activity
Local routes, language and time zones, care access, responsible adults, emergency consent, privacy across borders and follow-up after return.
RA-04
Major events and competitions
Event command, integration with venue teams, private support spaces, temporary-role limits, multilingual signposting, media risks and post-event continuity.
RA-05
In-house or commissioned clinical services
Professional registration, clinical independence, scope, supervision, consent, records, adverse events, emergency coverage and separation from selection.
RA-06
Outsourced providers, partners and member bodies
Due diligence, contractual safety and data duties, monitoring, subcontractors, delegated responsibility, escalation and termination.
RA-07
Remote and digital delivery
Location verification, secure communication, local emergency routes, crisis interruption, identity and age assurance, digital exclusion and quick exit.
RA-08
Access to potentially lethal means or high-risk environments
Lawful and proportionate temporary safety controls for firearms, medicines, vehicles, water, heights, isolated terrain and similar hazards, with qualified advice and privacy.
RA-09
Multiple sites, franchises and international federations
Central minimums, local addenda, delegation, member monitoring, conflict-safe escalation, independent sampling, language and scope control.
RA-10
Small or volunteer-led organisations
Proportionate documentation, shared or external routes, one-page aids and backups without weakening emergency, reporting, confidentiality or non-retaliation outcomes.
Questionnaire blueprint
Do not turn the document into 49 pages of yes/no questions.
Requirements define the obligation. Applicant questions locate and describe the claim. Evidence requests, auditor prompts and protected corroboration test whether the claim is true. These are separate instruments and must not be collapsed into one long self-report survey.
Working range: Approximately 28–36 Pillar 4 applicant-bank items, of which a typical organisation may see roughly 20–28 after routing. The range is a design hypothesis, not a quota or validated burden.
1
Scope and routing
About 4–6 unscored selectors
Activate jurisdiction, minors, residence, travel, event, clinical, outsourced, digital, high-risk and multi-site addenda.
2
Minimum Safety Foundation
About 8–12 applicant prompts
Locate each control and owner; mandatory conformity is decided from evidence, not self-reported points.
3
Indicator maturity
About 15–18 scored prompts
Use roughly three or four focused prompts per proposed indicator to distinguish stated, operational, systematic and independently verified practice.
4
Scheme integrity
About 3 attestations
Truthful cooperation, material disclosure and accurate public claims. These are unscored participation conditions.
5
Routed modules
About 6–12 bank items
Only shown where a risk context exists; not every organisation answers every module.
01 · Applicant questions linked to one requirement and one primary construct.
02 · Evidence requests that state what may demonstrate practice and what is not sufficient.
03 · Auditor prompts and sampling instructions that are never exposed as answer keys.
04 · Protected athlete and staff corroboration prompts with consent, independence and anti-retaliation safeguards.
Required reviewers
A draft this serious needs named challenge.
Clinical and suicide prevention
Urgent-concern wording, role boundaries, emergency escalation, rehearsal safety, means safety and post-incident support.
Safeguarding
Officer competence, conflict routes, triage, minors, retaliation, external notification and protected interviews.
Legal and privacy
Jurisdictional duties, confidentiality exceptions, data, retention, consent, selection use, complaints and disclosure.
Lived experience
Findability, trust, selection fear, accessibility, power, post-incident treatment and sport reality.
Operational and audit
Evidence burden, feasibility, sampling, exercises, service verification, nonconformity and CAPA closure.
Measurement
Construct boundaries, cross-pillar ownership, duplication, stage discrimination and scoring interaction.
Open pilot decisions
Implementation is visible. Adoption is still earned.
- 01
Confirm or reject the five-indicator Pillar 4 model and its cross-pillar boundaries.
- 02
Approve, amend or reject the ten Minimum Safety Foundation controls and their non-compensable status.
- 03
Approve final evidence-validity and role-based training-refresh periods.
- 04
Calibrate observation, minor, major and critical findings plus correction and reapplication rules.
- 05
Define protected athlete and staff corroboration, including youth-programme safeguards.
- 06
Approve the first pilot jurisdictions and controlled local legal and service addenda.
- 07
Decide how Bronze to Gold pathway verification operates and how Diamond independence is demonstrated.
- 08
Write final applicant questions, evidence requests, auditor prompts and protected-corroboration prompts only after the requirement model is stable.
Pillar 4 is inspectable. Its architecture is recorded; its requirements still need validation.
P4.5 is now part of working framework v1.1. Next comes named expert review, controlled question writing and pilot testing. Pillars 1 and 3 are also complete working packs; equivalent packs are still needed for Pillars 2 and 5.